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Hohr,,E., 1992. Environmental Norms, Society, and Economics.
Environmental norms seem to be on the upsurge everywhere. Norm-orientation
is, however, neglected in neoclassical economics which is fixed on 'homo
economicus as the model of human behaviour. The paper addresses the
question whether homo economicus needs to give way to a norm-oriented
concept in environmental economics. This question is tackled in an inter-
disciplinary and evolutionary approach. Using economic concepts, forces are
identified which are detrimental to or which promote environmental norms in
the process of civilisation. This investigation provides some clues on the
likely importance of environmental norms in a future ecologically oriented
society. These clues provide in turn one answer to the fundamental question
posed, whether the neoclassical concept of human behaviour will likely remain
or cease to be the 'standard' tool in environmental economics. Rather .than
tackling the question in greatest generality the analysis takes recourse to an
example: the problem of the commons. The commons is particularly suited for
this investigation because it is well roamed by all the disciplines which are
of relevance for the undertaking.INTRODUCTION
In the new^ra of ecological concern we are permanently admonished to exhibit
environmental concern and act in accordance with it. For example, we are
advised to save energy, to boycott environmentally harmful products and buy
green ones in the stores, to avoid waste creation, to recycle almost every-
thing-, to book holidays in resort hotels friendly to nature, and once there to
stay on the hiking trails or skiing slopes. This list could go on and on.
Environmental norms, rules which restrict environmentally harmful behaviour
or which prescribe ecologically friendly actions seem to be on the advance
everywhere. .
Norms govern individual behaviour. They do so, however, without being
given hierarchical authority and without taking recourse to monetary in-
centives. Environmental norms may therefore appeal as an alternative to the
classical environmental management approaches of command and control and
market incentives.
 J /
Governing individual behaviour in an ecological context, environmental
norms are a natural object of investigation in environmental economics. Alas,
environmental economics does rarely touch on environmental norms. In '
economic analyses they remain a missing link between human behaviour and
the environment. In this paper this missing link is partially explored. This is
done from a rather special perspective though.
Although the analysis borrows heavily from outside economics, it is
undertaken from well within an economist's perspective. In particular, a
central question to be tackled is whether the neoclassical model of human
behaviour, homo economicus, remains a viable model for analysing human-made
ecological problems and solutions thereof. Put differently, the paper
investigates whether and, if so, how much leeway neoclassical environmentaleconomics must give to other disciplines in the breeze blowing in the direction
of norm-orientation.
This question can perhaps be tackled in several ways. The approach
taken up here is evolutionary and relies on an analysis of societal organisa-
• tion and cultural change in the process of civilisation. The empirical motiva-^
tion for this admittedly heroic approach is the frequently voiced claim that
our pre-industrial ancestors and our aboriginal co-inhabitants of earth in the
Fourth World have been and still are able to manage their environment well
while we moderners are not. In face of this claim, I endeavour to explore the
possible role of environmental norms as sources of well-management as well as
the driving forces behind their fate in the process of civilisation. This
analysis relies on well established economic concepts such as efficiency and
economic organisation.
The purpose of this effort is to find some key determinants of the likely
future societal organisation as it pertains to the environment and to hazard an
educated guess whether it will be rather norm-oriented or not. It is hope'd'
that this can also give an answer to the question raised whether homo
economicus can remain a viable concept in environmental economics.
On this occasion I will also comment on the normative debate. In the wake
of growing ecological problems this debate has also set in in an ecological
context. The normative debate takes up the question which organisational
form a society should choose. There are three alternatives: the hierarchy,
market organisation and the commune. The hierarchical alternative relies on
command and control in enforcing compatibility of individual behaviour with
societal objectives. Market organisation relies on economic incentives, whereas
the communal alternative relies on norms. These societal alternatives have a
natural counterpart in a society's organisation of its relation to nature. Andany future ecological constitution will have to draw on either of these
alternatives.
-.•Much of the investigation is undertaken by example. This example is the
problem of the commons. The commons is an attractive object of this
investigation, in particular because it is well roamed by the disciplines which
are relevant for our analysis: history, anthropology and empirical, experi-
mental and theoretical economics. We shall start, however, with a brief sketch
of human behaviour in the commons as it is to be predicted if we employ the
neoclassical concept.
HOMO ECOMOKICUS IN THE COMMONS
Accepting that the environmental problem is a scarcity problem, the scarcity
manager, homo economicus, can be taken at least as a first approximation'to a
model of human behaviour in the ecological context. The neoclassical model of
human behaviour presupposes that a representative human has well defined
and stable preferences. He or she is modelled as a well informed,
consumption-oriented maximiser. Neoclassical economics is therefore a theory
of crafty egoistic decisions.
So what is the economist's prediction of the behaviour of homo economicus
in an ecological context? In order to answer this we must fix what the
This concept has attracted overwhelming criticism (most notably from the
school surrounding Simon (1957) as well as fierce support ensuring its
persistence (e.g. Friedman and Savage, 1948). In maintaining the
standard assumption of full rationality I dc not want to belittle this
criticism nor is it meant as the best approximation to reality. Rather I
consider it the best approximation (because it is identical) to the model of
human behaviour employed in mainstream economics. Maintaining the full
rationality postulate permits us to concentrate as succinctly as possible on
the challenge to homo economicus which is posed by what is the primary
concern of this paper.ecological context is. In that I abstain from a comprehensive definition.
Instead I want to mention three properties which are common to most
environmental problems.
The first property is the negative externality of human action. The
second is the discontinuity of environmental processes at certain thresholds.^
The third is the irreversibility thereof after having been pushed beyond a
threshold.
A good illustration of an ecological context is the commons. The classical
commons is a meadow jointly owned by several independent herdsmen. The
ecological context is straightforward. The grazing of one herdsman's cattle
diminishes the grazing conditions for others (negative externality). Once, a
certain threshold of deterioration has been surpassed the biotope collapses
(discontinuity). There is no direct way back after a collapse (irreversibility).
So what is the behaviour of homo economicus in the commons? The
economist's answer has been bloomingly given by the biologist Garret Hardin
in his famous paper "The Tragedy of the Commons":
;
•\
"Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be expected that each herdsman
will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the commons. ... Explicitly or
implicitly ... he asks, 'What is the utility to m§_ of adding one more animal to
my herd?' ... the rational herdsman [he is a homo economicus (E.M.)] con-
cludes that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another
animal to his herd. And another, and another ... . But his is the conclusion
reached by each and every herdsman sharing the commons. Therein is the
tragedy. ... Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all." (Hardin, 1968:
p.1244).Put succinctly and in relation to the environment in general, the
prediction is that the rational human will overuse the environment compared to
the social optimum. This prediction is rather general. It can be almost always
made when homo economicus is applied to any environmental problem. This is
because the underlying structure is most often the same. It does not pay for
the individual to cooperate with others even if others behave in the interest
of the" common environment. Seen .through the spectacles of a neoclassical
economist the environmental problem is the notorious prisoner's dilemma. The
ecological facts as we happen to perceive them seem to overwhelmingly
support this prediction.
For the normative debate two things follow from an economist's bleak'
outlook on the fate of the environment. First, economics identifies in the
excessive use of the environment a societal deficit and thus evokes the
normative debate. And second, economics takes position in the quarrel about
which of the three organisational alternatives to choose.
Separated by a paradigmatic quantum jump from the commune, economists
sympathise with hierarchies and the organisational alternative of voluntary
exchange. Perhaps surprisingly, however, in between those two, hierarchy
wins at least in a first round. "
This is because the market oriented environmental constitution critically
hinges on the existence of exclusive property rights. Therefore, economics
puts the initially unclaimed environment on a silver plate for appropriation by
the state. The state is then called upon to execute rights over this new
property through the application of a suitable environmental policy. However,
there is disagreement which environmental policy should be chosen.
One camp supports a hierarchical orientation of environmental policy while
a second favours an exchange oriented one. Under the first approach the
state maintains the property rights over the environment and defends theserights against the desires of its subjects by way of command and control.
Under the second approach the state sells the titles to the usurped
environment to the private sector through a system of environmental taxes or
tradeable permits.
Contributions to this debate are legion. As of today it is undecided.
However, if the importance of the environment continues to grow as it did i-n
the past the outcome surely will have a constitutional dimension. Not only will
the green constitution be minted. It may even have an impact on the political
constitution and the normative debate in general.
For example, I have argued elsewhere (Mohr, 1990) that the command and
control approach to ensure the application of environmental safeguards in new"
projects can be a challenge to the trichotomy of powers. This can arise
because in constitutional democracies environmental bureaucracies are nested
in a legal system which guarantees to potential project operators'the right of
appeal in court if unsatisfied with a bureaucracy's permission decision. If this
right is effective, property rights over the environment are in fact non-ex-
clusive and commonly held by potential project operators and the environ-
mental bureaucracy, with a pivotal role reserved for the courts. The environ-
mental cake will then be divided in a bargaining process, with courts playing
the role of an outside option.
It can be shown that in this situation environmental policy is fraught with
deficiencies. In general it is socially suboptimal, it can be completely
ineffective or it can have an adverse effect on welfare. This policy problem
can be resolved, however, by forsaking the effective right of appeal. Under
this green constitution there remains therefore a conflict between the pursuit
of environmental policy and the maintenance of the political constitution. If
the environment is becoming increasingly scarce this conflict may become
increasingly pressing.Let us return into the commons and let us glance critically once more at
the economists gloomy prediction emanating from the application of
homo economicus. Is the environment always excessively used? Does freedom
in a commons necessarily bring ruin to all?
Doubts are warranted. Although this prognosis is supported by what we
observe on the modern commons, in a historical or in a cross-cultural per-
spective matters are less straightforward. In the past, property had fre-
quently been held as a commons and cultural history is rich in examples
where the commons had not been ultimately ruined but had sustained the
.prosperity of communities (see for example Dahlman, 1980; Runge, 1981).
This historical "success" in mind, for some the comr.ons is even a paragon of
social virtues and cooperation, and a model for the resolution of environmental
problems (Swaney, 1990).
In providing an explanation for this success story authors make a
distinction between free access and common property (Ciriary-Vantrup and
Bishop, 1975; Runge, 1981). According to this distinction open access refers
to a situation in which the environment can be exploited by an unlimited
number of users without limits. Common property refers to a situation where
a well defined group of right-holders uses the environment in accordance with
well established rules. Making this distinction, Hardin's tragedy is claimed to^
be, in fact, a tragedy of free access whereas under the governance of
common property welfare can prosper.
A similar observation has been made by anthropologists in the Fourth
World. In autochthonal societies the commons is a frequent form of property.
These "primitive" societies have developed sophisticated rules of social con-
duct which prevent the tragedy from coming down on them (e.g. Berkes et
al., 1989; Buck, 1989; Casimir and Rao, 1991; and MacCay and Acheson,
1987). Homo economicus seems to invite us therefore to improve on itself.An economist's retort could be that cooperation can emerge in a prisoner,'s
dilemma even if homo economicus is the representative player. One only needs
to confront players with the same game ever again. In such a supergame
perfectly rational and egoistic players cooperate if suitable punishment
strategies are played (Friedman, 1971). However, if the repetitive character
of the game is combined with the vulnerability of the opportunity set to
non-cooperative behaviour such as is the case in the commons and in almost
every environmental problem, even punishment strategies can ensure only a
moderate degree of cooperation (Lewis and Cowans, 1983).
Laboratory experiments come to a similar conclusion. In Axelrod's (1981)
famous experiment, living persons cooperate in a repeated prisoner's dilemma
situation. And, interestingly, simple strategies such as "tit-for-tat" are
particularly successful in furthering a player's payoff and in bringing about
cooperation. Axelrod's experiment creates the social conflict of the prisoner's
dilemma. However, it does not create the ecological conflict in the commons.
In another experiment by Spada and Ernst (1990) the Axelrod experiment
has therefore been repeated in an ecological context. In game theoretic terms
this experiment was set up as a dynamic game reminiscent of formal models of
common fisheries (e.g. Levhari and Kirman, 1980). The more the environment
was used by subjects at one time the less of it was left next time. Although
compared to Axelrod's experiment the need to cooperate was even more
pressing and although cooperation would have made sustainability possible the
emergence of non-cooperation was frequent. And, perhaps surprisingly, it
was the otherwise so successful "tit-for-tat" strategy which all to often
triggered an early devastation of the commons and left all subjects in a payoff
desert.
Both the theoretical and the experimental approaches tread on common
ground. Both identify in the repetitiveness of social interaction a relief fromthe unavoidability of non-cooperation. Both identify in the commons a source
for the .emergence of non-cooperation despite the repetitive nature of social
interaction. Both fail to predict the emergence of cooperation as we know it
from history and from aboriginal societies.
The failure of these approaches to predict cooperation in their stylised
representation of human behaviour in an ecological context invites us to
w
inquire into the possible causes for this failure. Although a number of
different reasons can be imagined for each of them (see for example the
game-theoretic justification of cooperation given in Runge (1981) , but see also
Guttman (1982) and Palmquist and Pasour (1982) on this) there is at least one
reason which seems to be common to both.
Both lack the relevance of social norms. There is no need to testify
further to this in the case of the mathematically oriented approach. But the
experimental approach seems also in want of a suitable representation of
environmental norms. Subjects in interactive laboratory experiments know
about the test character of the exercise, they know about the fleeting nature
of their relationship, and just like homo economicus in a formal "experiment"
they feel obliged to follow the "rules of the game" which frame their payoff
function artificially and which determine the opportunity set of their actions.
Social norms escape traditional formalisation. My hunch is, they also escape
the laboratories. Economics, environmental or not, theoretical or not,
iexperimental or not, leaves a bit of a vacuum in that respect.
ENVIRONMENTAL NORMS
In economics humans are consumption orientated maximisers. Sociology models
humans as norm-oriented conformists. With conformists the third contestant
for victory in the normative debate - the commune - becomes a sudden10
alternative. The fate of the environment does now hinge not on the egoism of
individuals. It is determined instead by their desire to avoid social conflicts.
The role of norms is to ensure the survival of the commune. The commune
relies on the separation of insiders and outsiders. Norms alleviate the
distinction between them. Norms also increase the costs for insiders to free-
ride and desert the commune (Douglas, 1989, p. 50). ^
Here the normative debate sets in again. This time, however, it comes in
the form of moral campaigns of the green movement. There are innumerable
examples of it. The campaigns pressing consumers to discriminate against
one-way beverage containers, to separate garbage at home and to boycott-
tropical timber are but some.
Environmental norms sustain a societal structure in which the common
environment is shared by equals. The admissible bounds on its use or its
proper use within the set of feasible actions is determined by environmental
norms. These define the demarcation line between the environmental conscious
insiders and the group of outsiders which blunder the environment.. And
coherence amongst equals is sustained by appealing tb the self-image of
insiders, chastening the occasional and banishing the recalcitrant sinner.
Environmental norms appear to be on the advance everywhere. Are we on
a march into an environmental commune? Will the normative debate be-,- decided
in favour of the communal alternative? Or, put differentially, will the norm-
orientated conformist defeat the consumption orientated maxiraiser?
To answer these questions it helps to look at the efficiency properties of
environmental norms and at their genesis and evolution. Presumably, a
reasonable hypothesis is that the chances for the communal alternative to end
up as winner in the normative debate will be rather small if environmental
norms tend to be inefficient. Implicitly, the admittedly contestable
presumption is that rationality is a key element in guiding the debate.11
Elster (1989) has argued that norms need neither be efficient nor welfare
improving.'This view can be upheld in the case of environmental norms.
. For example, a cost-benefit analysis of one-way and refill beverage
systems, taking account, of all environmental costs, would have to count
amongst others the larger waste volume of one-way systems against the higher
energy input of refill systems due to additional weight and transportation.
Taking all this into account, non-composite one-way containers can come out
better than a refill-system with a short life cycle of containers or with long
transportation routes. These considerations are typically neglected in anti
one-way campaigns.
A further striking example of the inefficiency of environmental norms is
the separation of garbage at home. In some countries (e.g. Germany) a
growing number of municipalities are providing for the collection of separated
household garbage (paper, glass, plastics etc.). Material is separated and
supplied by households, basically on a voluntary basis. It is supposed to be
eventually recycled. In terms of quantities supplied and collected, this norm
is a success. However, due to the satiation of recycling outlets municipalities
are frequently forced to deal with separated garbage in the ordinary, i.e.
thermal or kerbside way.
To continue, a norm to boycott tropical, timber reduces the value of
rainforests as a reproducible resource, encouraging'deforestation for purposes
of ranching and alternative uses. Therefore, and on the contrary of what a
boycott does to rainforests, some authors even suggest a cartelisation of
tropical timber exporters (e.g. Rauscher (1990)). According to this rationale,
a boycott is indeed counter-productive.
Not only do we observe inefficient environmental norms quite frequently.
Looking at their evolution even suggests that they need not necessarily yield
to efficient ones. Even more than that, some of the driving forces behind12
their evolution appear to systematically favour inefficient norms and oppress
efficient ones.
A
For example, Sugden (1989) has claimed that norms can spread by
2
analogy. If an analogy can be drawn between an area in which a norm is
valid and another area in which it- is not yet valid, its validity can expand to
the latter area too. For example, an analogy can be drawn between fruit juice
containers and milk containers by reference, if this is the case, to the one-
way nature of both. With this analogy a norm not to buy juice in one-way
containers can cover milk as well.
It is evident that a mechanism for the systematic diffusion of efficient
norms does not exist if norms spread by analogy and if they were inefficient
in the first place. However such a mechanism fails to exist even in those
cases in which norms are efficient where they had been in force originally.
For example, an analogy between fruit juice containers and milk containers to
the effect of boycotting the use of the latter neglects the fact that the former
are made of composite material to protect it from the acidity of its content.
Fresh milk containers need not be and usually are not made of composite
material. But it is the composite nature of containers which is substantially
increasing environmental costs as, with the exception of aluminium-plastic
composites, they can hardly be recycled (Rat von Sachverstandigen fur
Umweltfragen, 1991, p. 245).
The purpose of norms to separate insiders from outsiders presumably
plays also some part in their diffusion. The intuition is that norms which
2
Sugden investigates norms which are solutions to coordination games.
Although these are certainly only a subset of all norms, his explanation
for the dissemination of norms appears more general than this rather
special reason for their existence.|3©§ institute fur Weifwirtschai
13
make this separation easier than others have better chances to thrive. This
implies, however, that evolutionary successful norms will often be oriented
towards the enforcement of superficialities which will have little to do with
the complicated ecological and economic causes of an environmental problem.
The correctness of our behaviour is therefore measured by the maximum
speed of our cars instead of by their emission properties, or by the size
 f\of
our garbage sacks instead of by their content. This criterion for a successful
dissipation of norms does not cater to efficient ones either. Instead it is the
ones which are oriented towards superficiality, and hence which are often
inefficient, which can thrive.
Both criteria, the ease with which an analogy can be drawn and the ease
.with which insiders can be distinguished from outsiders, have an important
property in common. They depend on a common experience by all who are
supposed to obey a norm as well as by those who are supposed to control
obedience . This puts a tight lid on what"environmental norms can achieve in
a society. They can spread and prosper in the realm of daily life. They may
be able to govern behaviour within a professional circle. But they are
squarely inadequate in providing outside control in the world of special
knowledge and activities. In addition, demands on control mechanisms in terms
of efficiency are likely to increase (exponentially?) with the complexity of
what is to be controlled. Hence, a trust in environmental norms in controlling
high tec or high sci activities such as gene technology belongs to the realm
of wishful thinking.
See Sugden (1989) for this claim in the case of the first criterion. It is
self-evident that this claim can be upheld in the case of the second
criterion too.14
As specialised knowledge and activities remain unchallenged from the
control of environmental norms and because in those areas in which environ-
mental norms can develop there is little that lets efficient norms evolve, it
seems save to conclude, that their role in the organisation of our society's
relationship to its environment" will remain bounded. In answering the
questions posed earlier it seems therefore also safe concluding that we^ are
neither on a march into an environmental commune nor will the consumption
oriented maximiser in a model of human behaviour will have to be kicked out.
This does not imply that norm orientation is a quirk that can be left aside
in all economic analyses of environmental problems. It may be important- in
cases. However, for an investigation of human behaviour within the
environmental constitution as it can be sketched on the basis of above
considerations the classical hypothesis of economics, pitted against norm
orientation, seems acceptable more often than not.
THE DECLINE OF ENVIRONMENTAL NORMS AND THE DOOM OF THE COMMONS
There remain some important questions unanswered. Why had our own
commons been well managed way back in the past and why is it not today?
Today, why does the commons remain a well maintained place in the Fourth
World but not in the Third, Second and First?
These questions can be given a dynamic interpretation. In this
interpretation the questions are what happened to our commons on our own
travel through time and what is happening to the culture of the commons in
the process of adaptation of aboriginal societies to the modern world? Answers
to these questions may provide an explanation to the observation that the
process of civilisation does harm to the commons (Franke and Chasin, 1980).15
I shall discuss three possible explanations from various disciplines for the
passing away of the culture of the commons. They are complementary and
mutually enforce each other.
The first draws on above analysis of the evolution of norms. The
civilisatory process is or comes about with a process of specialisation which
puts aside ever more activities from the world of daily life and protects them
from effective control through norms. The commons is increasingly influenced
by these specialised activities and the once protective shield of environmental
norms is weakened. This explanation ascribes the decline of environmental
norms and the doom of the commons to organisational changes which are
detrimental to the maintenance of environmental norms.
The anthropologist Michael Jochim (1981) has given a different ex-
planation. It hinges on a behaviouristic model of humans in an ecological con-
text. Just as in both the cases of homo economicus and the norm-oriented
conformist, operative behaviour dictates human actions (op. cit. p. 17). But
the link between behaviour and its consequences is neither created by an
(arbitrarily complicated) utility maximisation nor is conformity the sole
objective. Rather, behaviour is orientated towards the anticipated effects of
positive and negative reinforcement. Human behaviour is therefore modelled in
reminiscence of the famous rat experiments in which test animals avoid or
choose a certain action, depending on whether-this action triggers punishment
(negative reinforcement) or reward (positive reinforcement).
Jochim makes a strong case that the environment provides a plethora of
reinforcement. Thus he explains behaviour in an ecological context. In this
framework, environmental norms can be interpreted as codified environmental
reinforcers.
This model provides an explanation for the doom of the commons in the
civilisatory process if in market economies, as Jochim argues, "the strength16
of cultural (monetary) reinforcement is greater than most consequences of
activities themselves in perpetuating behaviour" (op. cit. p. 207). Environ-
mental norms representing direct consequences of activities in the incentive
system lose in importance and finally pass away in the wake of the emergence
of markets. ~ \
This explanation also ascribes a decisive role to organisational change.
However, in providing a model for the link between outside stimulus and
individual behaviour the doom of the commons is predictable not due to the
emergence of norm-free sanctities but due to a retreat of environmental norms
in areas where they had traditionally been strong.
A third explanation for the doom of the commons can be found in
economics. It draws on the distinction between free access and common
property. This distinction is formalised in the literature in terms of the
number of decisionmakers in the commons. Under free access there is a
potentially infinite number of agents in the commons. In this case all in-
centives to invest into the commons vanish (Scott, 195T5) . Under common
property there is only a given and finite number of agents in the commons-.
In this case investment incentives are positive although socially suboptimal
(Levhari and Mirman, 1980; Stevenson, 1984). This suggests a detrimental
effect of an increase in the number of agents in the commons on the
individual incentives to invest into the maintenance of it.
I believe the environment has undergone a transformation in the process
of civilisation comparable in its effects to a large-scale increase in the number
of agents in formal economic models of the commons. Whereas the classical
commons and the associated environmental problem was shared and affected by
only a few, the modern commons is shared by many. This is not because the
old meadows and hunting areas are now being treaded on by more and more
people. Rather, civilisation has brought about new long distance impacts17
which collect a much greater number of humans in a much larger single
commons. Ozone depletion and global warming are obvious but rather extreme
points in case.
The common environment seems to have undergone a transformation from
being held as a common property to being exploited under free access. In the
wake of this transformation the once present incentive to invest in its
protection has disappeared.
Just as the others do, this explanation ascribes the doom of the commons
to a change in individual behaviour. However, this change is neither due to
the emergence of norm-free sanctities nor to the retreat of environmental
norms where they had been traditionally strong. Rather it is due to the
emergence of new commons which are in above sense "much too large".
Arguably our commons has been, and with respect to "advancing"
autochthonal societies is being knocked out by all three forces at once. These
forces are unlikely to disappear again. On the contrary, as civilisation con-
tinues to "advance" they are likely to grow stronger. For the normative
debate it follows from these considerations that the need for an environmental
•constitution presumably will grow alongside. As two of these forces are born
out of a secular decline of environmental norms the environmental constitution
will instead have to rely to great extent on hierarchical or market orientation.
CONCLUSIONS
The paper provides an evolutionary analysis of environmental norms. The
purpose is to get some clues on their future importance in an emerging
ecologically oriented society. It is hoped that these clues also provide an
insight into the issue whether in light of a seeming resurrection of environ-
mental norms the standard economic model of human behaviour,18
homo economicus, will have to give way to a norm-orientated concept in
environmental economics.
I have argued in the main body of the paper that the neoclassical analysis
of the commons, employing homo economicus, fails to predict the maintenance
f
of and cooperation in the commons as it occurred and is occurring in
aboriginal societies. This failure was attributed to the neglect of
environmental norms in the economic analysis of environmental problems. In an
investigation of environmental norms it was subsequently argued that they
neither need be efficient nor will efficient norms necessarily emerge in an
evolutionary process. Furthermore, additional factors were identified which
are systematically detrimental to the survival of environmental norms in the
process of civilisation. This suggests that environmental norms will likely play
only a minor role in an environmental constitution as it seems to emerge in
our ever more ecologically oriented society. As a relieve to conservative
economists (like myself) this also suggests that the standard model of human
behaviour, homo economicus, will remain a robust tool in predicting human
behaviour in an ecological context.
Attesting a not too bright future to environmental norms does not imply
that they are unworthy of economic investigation. On the contrary, I take
the above investigation rather as a modest beginning of such an analysis than
the end of it. For example, it would be interesting to look into the role, if
any, of environmental norms in green markets in the light of the persistent
verification and signalling problem. It would also be interesting to investigate
which environmental problems could be resolved most efficiently by the appli-
cation of suitable norms. A scope for environmental norms as a policy in-
strument could thus emerge. If it will, I might have to back out again
somewhat from the position I developed here. After all, the analysis in this
paper takes for granted that the evolution of environmental norms is19
independent of deliberate policy intervention, a hypothesis which invites us to
a closer look by itself.20
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